We investigate the characteristics of inward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in State Owned Enterprises (SOE). Under the hypothesis that SOE is a profit maximizer in a naturally monopolized industry due to economy of scale but the price and its investment return are regulated by its government, we derive a theoretical model for FDI and estimate an observable empirical model that is associated with the theoretical model. Using FDI and corporate income statement data of Korean operating SOEs, we find that FDI flows into SOEs that enable the foreign investors to earn excess profit, rather than earning competitive profit by increasing productivity. This empirical analysis shows that FDI's spillover effect on productivity and employment in which most of literature on FDI argued about does not work at least in SOE's case.
Introduction
Foreign investment plays a crucial role in developing countries in order for the fast economic growth to improve their living standard, measured by productivity such as Gross Domestic Product. The investment, from either domestic financial market or foreign countries, becomes accumulation of physical capital that is major production factor with labor input, so the more investment yields the more capital accumulation that would lead higher production level. Since a closed economy is only able to generate investment that is the equal amount of saving at the same time in the long-run, however, the economy may not generate the optimal rate of growth if the economy cannot make sufficient amount of saving, which turns out to be capital investment. This is the main reason that the government of a developing country tries to promote foreign investment that flows into domestic firms. In most cases where the government promotion policy for foreign investment, FDI has almost always taken place as the highest priority, out of three different types of foreign investment such as portfolio investment and international aid because it has the highest commitment to become physical capital, whereas the foreign portfolio investment has no commitment on it and receiving international aid are not eligible for developing countries.
Following the main purpose to promote inward FDI, the most of studies on FDI argued that it increases productivity of domestic firms as recipients dramatically. From Caves (1974) to its subsequent analyses, the literature argued that FDI inflow improves the domestic FDI recipient firms in various channel. Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (2003) summarize the channels in which there is a consensus of international business related studies on it into three categories: 1) direct technology transfer, 2) competitive pressure, and 3) adverse selection due to information asymmetry.
1 Chang and Rhee (2011) argue that inward FDI motivate domestic firm to become multinational and improve its performance. On the international economics relate studies such as Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004) , the inward FDI would yield productivity spillover effect to the recipient firm and its industry. As Chung, Mitchell, and Yeung (2003) , Buckley (2007) , Meyer (2009), and Thang (2011) argue about, on the other hand, a skepticism on the FDI's spillover effect came out. Because those studies rely highly on empirical foundation, however, those do not provide the reason that FDI has no effect, or little, on domestic firms productivity. Either way of analyzing the effect of FDI, we can find a consistent tendency on the FDI literature that they presume that the main goal of inward FDI is to increase recipient's productivity, regardless how much investment return the investor is able to earn. Theory of investment, in general, points out that investment is a rational decision that maximizes the return, subject to the certain degrees of risk. The presumption, conducted by FDI literature carelessly, is thus more consistent with the general characteristic of foreign aid, rather than the investment in general. Official Development Assistance, the most well known definition of foreign aid that is constituted by OECD, defines foreign aid as: "official financing flows that is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main object.", which means that foreign aid is the money flows that aims to increase productivity of recipient's economy. Therefore, the tendency that the FDI studies treated the FDI as foreign aids does not deal with FDI as a class of general investment decision.
This notion contradicts with the argument of previous literature, by considering a counterexample. Suppose that a foreign investor looks for a chance to invest in a firm in a country in which two firms are operating, and one is monopoly while other is competitive firm. Suppose also that those two firms make the same amount of revenue in every fiscal year. In this case, the investor will choose the monopoly firm to invest because the competitive firm cannot make positive operating profit, so that investment return is zero until the firm improves it's production technology in which the firm is capable of producing the same output level with less production cost. This counterexample shows that not all FDI have an incentive to improve the recipient firms' productivity as long as there exists an investment alternative that does not necessary to improve the productivity such as monopoly firm. In addition, it tells also that investing in the competitive firm is no longer attractive in a sense that increasing a firm's productivity is timely and costly. On the other hand, investment in the monopoly firm has no, or less incentive to increase the firm's productivity as long as the firm makes positive monopoly profit by reducing production because it is timely and costly also.
In other words, market structure of industries, where the FDI recipients operate, plays a crucial role to identify the FDI's pure impact on the host firm's productivity, by controlling different motivation of FDI decision. But it is very rare to see FDI literature that controls for market structure and motivations. On one side of studies on FDI, which support the positive effect of FDI such as Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Javorcik (2004) , and on the other side of which point out the ambiguity of FDI's productivity spillover such as Chang and Rhee (2011), Chung et al (2003) , and are not considering and controlling the market structure in their empirical analyses, and this absence may cause inconsistent estimation of their models, which is a biased estimation with large sample size, due to endogeniety. More precisely, the FDI's positive effect is not spillover, which is an exclusive productivity improvement, but it is just an additional production by adding more capital input, if the motivation of FDI is just earning monopoly profit.
In order to demonstrate the pure FDI's productivity spillover effect, therefore, we choose state owned enterprises as our experimental field, and analyze the pattern of inward FDI that flows into SOEs. There are three reasons that we choose SOEs. First, SOE is categorized as a class of public institute. Second, public institute, which produces public goods and services, regulates their pricing even though it normally operates in naturally monopolized industry, where there is another chance to earn excess profit by excising monopoly pricing, due to economy of scales. Because of the price regulation, moreover, individual firm's pricing strategy plays no role to determine the SOE's profit and the associated investment return.
Finally, information about the public institute's market operation is open to public, so that information asymmetry between the firm and the investor would not work. In addition, SOE has become a remarkable player in global FDI flow. According to UNCTAD (2012) , there were 650 SOEs participating management operation of 8500 foreign affiliates, and 11% of total FDI amount in global financial market has been made by the SOEs. is a study that demonstrates FDI's effect on productivity of Chinese SOEs. In this study, inward FDI is decomposed into several different sources, try to measure the different magnitude of the effect of FDI inflow on industry-wide labor productivity. Since the study takes cross sectional data, collected in 1995, however, it could not capture the dynamics of FDI to SOEs, and did not take advantage of the unique characteristic in which SOEs operate in monopoly industry but it does not exercise monopoly pricing. This specification may yield inconsistent estimation due to model misspecification, 2 so the result is hard to be confirmed as the FDI's true characteristic.
For the purpose of investigating the pure FDI spillover effect, as mentioned before, we take advantage of SOEs' characteristics in order to design an appropriate experiment. We collect annual corporate financial statement data for 27 Korean SOEs and 20 Korean privatized SOEs, and their individual records of FDI receipt. Then we derive an observable model for FDI determination equation to estimate and test what motivate foreign investors to decide investing in SOEs. Since the SOE's pricing is regulated by its government, we can assume that the investment return, which is associated with the regulated price, is given exogenously. By considering the factors that control for firm heterogenous production technology, we can exploit a testable hypothesis whether FDI is motivated by having a chance to improve the recipients' productivity then realize competitive profit that is positive, or by obtaining positive profit that is given by market structure and government pricing.
We exploit a research hypothesis from the above fact and test it empirically. If the production technology related factors are significantly affecting on FDI receipt, whereas the mark-up, the excess profit given by government pricing, does not affect, then it turns out to be a supporting evidence of existence of FDI spillover effect. But the result of our empirical analysis represents that the inward FDI to SOEs is motivated by the mark-up while the lagged FDI does not effect on SOEs performance measure. Hence, the conclusion would be following: there is no difference of effect on productivity between FDI and the domestic investment so there is no spillover effect, at least FDI in SOEs like firms. The organization of this paper is following: First, we introduce some stylized and historical facts around Korean SOEs and FDI in section 2. Then we review theory of public sector pricing to apply the model for SOEs' FDI determination in section 3. With these stylized facts and the theory, we derive an observable model for FDI in SOEs at section 4, then present its estimation results in section 5.
FDI and State Owned Enterprises in Korea
In this section, we introduce some stylized facts around FDI and SOEs in Korea to examine whether the Korean economy has a distinguished feature of FDI and the SOEs' operation in the domestic market as opposed to general features of FDI and SOEs. First, we introduce the pattern of FDI receipts dynamics and the associated government policies. Then we move on to SOEs, introducing the list of SOEs under the Korean government definition, and history of the SOEs. Finally, we introduce privatized Korean SOEs.
Foreign Direct Investment in Korea
It is well known fact that the Korean economy had been made the fastest economic growth during the mid 70s and 90s, given the relatively low inflation rate and the small size of domestic market, and the growth rate was significantly depending on rapid expansion of international trade, especially rapid growth of export. In the mean time, foreign investment inflow to the Korean domestic firms was also growing faster, but the trend has been changed around 1998 when the economy faced a recession due to running out of foreign currency, called foreign currency crisis, along the declined economic growth in a decade of 2000.
The left panel of figure 1 represents aggregate inward FDI dynamics of Korean firms. There is upward trend on FDI until 1998, then it stays constant at a certain amount. The volatile trend during 1960s to the middle of 70 might be occurred due to which the foreign investors of Korean economy prefer one-shot investment. If it is true, furthermore, the relatively stable upward tendency after 70s came up with which the preference of the foreign investors has been shifted from one-shot to sequential investment because of the steady and fast growth, the Korean economy had been made. The right panel is the time plot that decomposes FDI series into private and SOEs. Note that the vertical line at 1998 indicates is a hypothetical breakpoint for foreign currency crisis. FDI dynamics for private firms seems to follow the general tendency of the aggregate FDI series, whereas FDI in SOEs, the dashed line, begins in the middle of 90, then seems to stay constant. Since the general tendency keeps stable from the late 90, and since SOEs have started to receive FDI from the late 90 and keeps its amount constant, it seems that the FDI in SOEs itself has identical dynamics to general FDI receipts series.
After the foreign currency crisis, the Korean government had conducted several policies that aim to stimulate foreign investment on domestic firms. The Foreign Investment Promotion Act 3 defines FDI as which foreigners invest corporates or companies in Republic of Korea by purchasing capital stocks, or corporate stock shares to participate business activities of the Korean companies and hold permanent relationship with the corporates and companies. The foreign investor can be either the investor's company itself, or its parent company or the parent company's shareholders who lend loans to the foreign investment company under sufficiently long-term contract, at least five years. According to the promotion act, FDI by purchasing corporate stocks should be 1) a foreigner owns common stocks of corporates and companies in Rep, of Korea that is higher than 10% of total equity of the company, and excise voting right, or 2) foreigners own common stocks that is less than 10% but participation of business activities is able to be proved by officially documented contracts. In addition, FDI in Korean corporates and companies can be formed in four different categories: 1) establishing a new business, or purchasing stock warrants, 2) purchasing common corporate stocks, 3) long-term loan, and 4) mergers and acquisitions. The foreign investment that satisfies those criteria is eligible to apply foreign investment benefit package, which consist of corporate income tax reduction, five years elimination, plus 50% reduction after three years of local government tax, access to an exclusive public services. The package also includes usage of government real estate assets without additional payment for greenfield types of investment project.
State Owned Enterprises in Korea
In 2007, the Korean ministry of finance constituted the Public Institute Operating Act to discriminate necessary and unnecessary public owned institutes in every year of January. Public owned institutes are thus to be evaluated their necessity and decided to be able to be funded by government. In addition, the ministry of finance classifies public owned institute into four categories and each categories have different criteria and operational goals such as proportion of government funding, out of its entire revenue in a fiscal year. There are two categories that refer to as SOEs, one is "market oriented SOE" and the other is "semi-market oriented SOE". The market oriented SOE is a SOE that earns the annual revenue in which the proportion of operating revenue is greater than 85%, the number of employees is greater than 50, and it owns more than two trillion won ($ 1.4 billion in USD PPP) as its asset. The semi market oriented SOE is a SOE that earns annual revenue that consists of higher than 50% operating revenue. In January 2011, there were 14 market oriented SOEs that operate in industries such as gas, petroleum oil, local heating, and airports, and 13 semi-market oriented SOEs within mining, highway and railway.
Privatized State Owned Enterprises in Korea
Privatization of Korean SOEs have been done mostly in the president Dae-Jung Kim's administration from 1998 to 2002, even though every presidential administrations announced the list of SOEs to be privatized as their economic policy agenda. Political conflict has generally interrupted to privatized SOEs but not in Kim's administration due to foreign currency crisis in the late 1997. Since public owned institutes supply their goods and services to their domestic economy under regulated prices, it turns naturally out to be a significant source of government deficit. Therefore, president Kim and his administration were able to plan to privatizing 11 parents SOEs and their 77 sister companies, and the privatization had been done for 8 parents SOEs and their 66 sister companies during that time without facing severe political debate. The privatized SOEs are electricity, road and highway, housing, water resources, telecommunication, tobacco, natural gas, heavy industry, and so on. Table 1 present the list of SOEs that have received FDI more than once. There are only two SOEs, which have never been privatized during the sample period, and the rest of SOEs have received FDI after privatization. The only exception is Asiana Airlines. It received 172,000 U.S dollars before privation, 0.2% of the total amount, then 80,000,000 U.S dollars have been received after privatization. This fact reflects that privatized SOEs are more preferable than non-privatized SOEs, and the reason would be the monopoly profit, which we will discuss later.
Theory of State Owned Enterprises: Literature review
This section is to review previous literature on SOE on the perspective of international business and public finance, a discipline of economics. We will employ some ideas from the previous literature on SOE to model for inward FDI on SOE, so that we pay specific attention on public sector pricing that determines prices of goods and services, produced by SOEs, and the SOEs' investment return. Vernon (1979) proposes the definition and the role of SOE, on the international business perspective. According to his argument, SOE is a tax collection agency by producing and selling goods and services to the public, and it leads an industry to make domestic economy as a whole better off. Also SOE play a role in international market that stimulates international trade by competing with foreign firms so it yields trickle down effect on domestic firms. Eventually, the international role of SOE leads domestic firms becoming more competitive in international market. The role of SOE, proposed by Vernon (1979) , does not seem to be an appropriate goal for SOE as a public institute. SOE rather plays a role to maximize social welfare that is to achieve an efficient allocation of scarce resources to all in its economy, than maximize its own profit because of the following reason.
Role of State Owned Enterprises
Becoming a competitive firm in international market can be achieved by supplying goods and services for both domestic and foreign economies at a lower price. This task requires to devote scarce resources given by its domestic economy for the international market oriented SOE, so that domestic producers and consumers can access only the resources that are left over, and eventually the scarce resources become more scarce. This is the main reason that a SOE has to be treated as a sort of public institute that allows public to participate its business activities. Bös (1985) defines SOEs as public enterprises, which produce public utilities such as energy, communication, and transportation, or operate in basic goods industries such as finance, agriculture, health and education. The public enterprise have generally been have regulations on their goods and services, according to Bös (1985) , in order to protect the economy from market failure, and most of the regulations imposes on prices of the public enterprises' goods and services because the primary concerned market failure is to behave monopoly in their industry.
Public Sector Pricing
In order to protect from becoming a monopolistic industry, public enterprises operate their business under a specific pricing strategy given by its government. Bös (1985) summarizes the major three public sector pricing, which are able to explain SOEs' pricing strategy. The first is marginal cost pricing, which is a pricing that charges consumers only the marginal production cost of public enterprises' goods and services. The other is Ramsey pricing that is an optimal pricing for a particular industry where there exists both public and private enterprises to produce a homogenous good or service, and the price regulation can be imposed only on the good or service, produced by the public enterprise. Note that Ramsey pricing set up the price of the public enterprises' good or service by considering demand for both public private enterprises' good or service simultaneously.
The two widely known public pricing are neither realistic, nor feasible. Marginal cost pricing can take place any quantity supplied, so that it is too ambiguous to be used as a consistent pricing strategy, also the price cannot stay constant if the SOEs' marginal production cost is not invariant. Furthermore, the price of good, given by marginal cost pricing, has to be lower than p, the competitive price and the SOE cannot avoid to make deficit if the price is lower than average total cost. The Ramsey pricing is also unrealistic for SOEs because the demand for goods, produced by both public and private enterprises, is merely observable to the SOEs. It is thus hard to think that SOEs, as public enterprises, set their price based on their own prediction, which might yield inconsistent pricing.
For these reason, the most feasible and realistic pricing strategy is rate of return regulation. The rate of return regulated pricing is a pricing to keep the public enterprises' rate of investment return constant. The rate of return regulated pricing is both flexible with respect to changes in production costs, and provides positive investment return for the investors, so the SOEs do not necessary to make deficit in which the government has to subsidize. Because of the positive and stable investment return, in addition, it is very attractive investment object, comparing with the conventional financial instruments such as stock, bond, and exchange. So the SOEs are able to generate capital investment if the rate of return guarantees a certain amount, which is at least higher than risk-free market return.
The figure 2 shows geometric representation of public sector pricing. As we reviewed also, public enterprises produce goods and services in monopoly industries so the demand curve, D, has downward slope. By producing y * * , the monopoly firm is able to earn the highest revenue, p * * times y * * . If the government excises marginal cost pricing, there are two different outcomes can come up with. If the regulated price is less than p, the competitive price, then the firm makes deficit, which has to be subsidized by the government. If the price is greater than p, on the other hand, the firm makes positive profit, which is able to be either reinvested, or taxed by the government.
The difference between marginal cost pricing and ROI fixed pricing comes from the possibility of which marginal can shift over time when the SOE faces different factor market. For public enterprises with marginal cost pricing, the amount of profit is determined by marginal cost curve, which represents production technology of firms, even though the government regulates the price. ROI fixed pricing, however, considers the demand condition and marginal cost condition simultaneously so that the firms can keep their profit constant. The shaded region in the figure 2 indicates profit that is given by ROI fixed pricing. This implies also that stable return for investors is guaranteed, given the time variant marginal cost that is uncertain for the investors.
FDI on State Owned Enterprises: A Model
In this section, we derive an empirical model for FDI on SOE to investigate what determines FDI on SOE. We design a model specification under the notions that 1) SOE is a profit maximizer in a monopoly industry, 2) market price for goods and services, produced by the SOE, is regulated by government until it is privatized, and 3) foreign investors face their own uncertainty for the market price due to interest rate and exchange rate parity between her home country and host country, changes in government pricing.
Theory of Foreign Investment on SOE
The reasoning to justify the three assumptions is following: The primary concern that a government operates SOE is to produce public goods and services efficiently for supplying the goods and services to its economy at a socially efficient price. The way to produce goods and services efficiently is to behave as a profit maximizer in a competitive market, for given production technology. Since the goods and services, produced by government, are social infrastructures that require massive initial capital and sequential investment over time, however, the industry in which the public good producer operates turns out easily to be natural monopoly due to scales of economy. For this reason, the SOE would excise monopoly pricing if the government let the firm set up the price by itself so that the government is willing to regulate the price. The marginal return for FDI investors on the SOE, under these circumstances, is given by price differential between the regulated price and marginal cost of producing a good. But it depends also on exchange and interest rate parities between the host and the investor countries. Since the SOE spends production cost using domestic currency, the exchange rate parity would affect only on the regulated price so it determines marginal foreign investment return.
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Finally, the change in the regulated price and exchange rate parity in the future are unobservable fro the investor so she treats it as an uncertain factor that the investor predicts to consider for FDI decision on SOE by her own forecasting rule.
5 Under the assumption 1),
we construct a SOE's present value profit maximization problem:
where D(y t , u t ) is total revenue that is a function of output y t and uncertain demand shift u t , c(y t ) is total cost, and f (K t , L t ) is production technology, a function of capital and labor input. The firm chooses the optimal K t+1 , the amount of future capital input that maximizes the present value of it's profit. Now we consider a new price p * in which the foreign investor recognizes to account for her marginal profit. As we discussed that p * depends on unobservable government pricing, exchange rate and interest rate parities, we assume that it is a function of unobservable price change u * t so that it is represented by a new function, denote p * (u * t ). Assume also that the production technology is constant return to scale. Then the foreign investment return maximization problem turns out to be the following:
where k t is capital-labor ratio, K t /L t , β * is discount rate for the foreign investor that reflects interest rate parity. Note that p * (u * t ) and c(y t ) can be thought as average total revenue and average total cost respectively, and since p * (u t ) does not depend on output, represented by f (k t ), it is equal to marginal revenue. By assuming u * t is a stochastic process with Martingale property, 6 the maximization problem becomes a standard dynamic stochastic programming 4 Assume that the firm, SOE, produces a single good or a service so that its marginal cost can account for obtaining profit.
5 In economics and theoretical corporate finance literature, the uncertainty is represented by a random variable for static model, and a stochastic process for dynamic model. Firms' forecasting rules is thus represented by the mathematical expectation. We will use this specification later in this chapter.
6 Martingale property of stochastic process is that the future realization of the stochastic process does depends only on the current realized value, not the past. This property is necessary condition to solve and the solution is the optimal future capital input k t+1 that maximizes a value function:
where Q(u * , du * ) is a transition density of u * t , which is a probability distribution function of u * over time. Because the investor does not have exact information about the firm's production technology, production cost, and the transition density of uncertain factors on the price, deriving an exact closed form from (4.1) is not relevant. However, we can exploit a simple testable model in which the FDI decision on the firm is determined by variables in the value function (4.1).
Empirical Model
Let I t be FDI on the SOE. From the value function (4.1), I t can be constituted that it is determined by which the investor chooses that maximizes the discounted future profit with respect to capital accumulation, k t+1 = I t + δk t . 7 For given capital depreciation rate δ and the current capital accumulation, the future period capital accumulation level is determined by the investment decision I t , so it is the solution of (4.1). Since I t is derived under foreign investor's maximization problem, and it purchase capital stock, it is relevant to treat I t as FDI at t. This leads to suggest a hypothetical linear model for FDI, which is observable as:
where AT R and AT C are average total revenue and total cost respectively, I t is investment from the domestic financial market. Because the FDI decision is made by forecasting β * E[ν(k t+1 , u * t )], the expected future profit, a lagged value of profit measure AT R t−1 − AT C t−1 would be natural for current FDI decision model. The rest of variables are control variables for production technology and the associated production cost, and the SOE's capital accumulation and investment status in domestic market. discrete dynamic optimization problem under uncertainty because the dynamic system link only two time points. It can be interpreted simply as the efficient market hypothesis, or random walk hypothesis about exchange rate parity u * t 7 Because k t is capital-labor ratio, we can think the investment I t as a rate of investment, out of current level of capital accumulation K t . Notes: Average total revenue is total revenue, divided by output, and average total cost is also total cost, divided by output. Mark-up is calculated by subtracting average total cost from average total revenue."# of obs" and "Std. dev" are the acronyms of "number of observations" and "standard deviation" respectively. Output, capital, labor, investment, and FDI are natural logarithmic scales. "Non-privatized " sample includes never privatized and before privatized SOEs. We take fixed asset and number of employments as the measures of physical capital and labor input respectively. The investment is the annual changes in fixed asset, which is the first order lagged difference of fixed asset. Note that all variables are in real terms, adjusted by two-digit industry classification level GDP deflators.
Empirical Analysis

Data
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The top panel of table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for variables in the model (4.2) of Korean SOEs by categorizing the SOEs into FDI receipts and non-FDI receipts. The left panel on the top is for SOEs, which have never been received FDI, and the right panel is for SOEs that have been received FDI at least once, over the sample periods, from 1980 to 2011. As we can see the mark-up at the first row, SOEs with FDI have greater mean and significantly low standard deviation than SOEs without FDI. This implies that FDI on Korean SOEs flows into the SOEs that have higher and stable return, and it may come from significantly low average total cost of the SOEs with FDI. By looking at the standard deviation of the average total cost for SOEs without FDI, however, we cannot conclude, in naïve fashion, that SOEs with FDI have better quality production technology so the technology enable them to produce goods and services with lower production costs, and eventually they earn higher profit than SOEs without FDI, under the same revenue stream. The volatile average total cost of SOEs without FDI makes difficult to conclude that the higher mark-up of SOEs with FDI comes from less marginal cost at a given price level.
By looking at the differences of the other variables in the table, which are related to production technology such as output and its factor inputs, capital and labor, we can see that the statistics show non of the variables have significant difference between SOEs with FDI and without FDI. These findings are consistent with graphical representations of the distributions of such variables. Figure 3 are the non-parametric distribution estimations for the four production related variables. As we interpreted in the top panel of The bottom panel of the table 2 is the descriptive statistics for the variables, categorized by privatization. The left panel is for SOEs that are not privatized, or before privatized, and the right panel is for privatized SOEs. The privatized SOEs have negative mark-up, whereas non-privatized SOEs still earn positive mark-up. This pattern looks as the same as the pattern in the top panel of the table in which higher average total cost of privatized SOEs yields negative mark-up, even though the privatized SOEs have slightly higher average total revenue. But the standard deviation of privatized SOEs' average total cost is incomparably high than non-privatized SOEs so that the naïve way to draw a conclusion is irrelevant.
The panel (a) of figure 4 shows an empirical average total revenue function of Korean SOEs, which is horizontal over the associated output level. The solid line through the data points is the LOESS (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) line, a non-parametric method to fit a simple regression line, and it shows also that the mean relationship between average total revenue and output of Korean SOEs is also confirming that it is horizontal. This empirical finding turns out to be a justification of our conjecture on SOEs that they operate under the particular pricing. The SOEs operate obviously in monopoly industries so that their average total revenue curve is downward sloping so that they have downward sloping demand as well, which allows them to excise monopoly pricing to maximize their profit. There might be an external force, however, to keep the average total revenue curve horizontal, and that force is the public pricing in which we can assume Korean government's pricing force on SOEs.
Unlike the empirical average total revenue curve, the average total cost curve, in panel (b) of figure 4, seems to be a U-shaped. It is consistent with the theory of firms that average total cost function is a convex function of output so that it yields upward sloping marginal cost. Note that the solid line in the panel (b) is LOESS non-parametric average cost curve. The two firms' production decision related plots provide notable evidences that support the assumptions of which our theoretical model of FDI decision on SOEs is necessary to impose to derive. The model estimation is thus relevant way to investigate specific preference of FDI on SOEs in a different way that usual FDI determinant studies argue about.
Estimation
FDI data, as a variable, is aggregated by firm and by year to match with the other variables from annual corporate income statement and we use each firms' accumulated FDI over time to control single FDI inflow and multiple FDI inflow for a particular firm. Eventually we have an annual panel data for Korean SOES with inward FDI records. So the model that represents the panel data is given as:
where u it is an idiosyncratic error term. The parameters in the model hypothesize the effect of the exploratory variables on FDI decision. For instance, if β 2 and β 4 are significantly positive whereas β 1 is statistically insignificant, it means FDI comes up with increasing in production and employment without realizing monopoly profit. This result is a sort of supporting evidence of FDI spillover effect on domestic firm's productivity. On the other hand, if β 1 is significantly positive while β 2 and β 4 are negative, it means FDI for SOE comes up to realize monopoly profit by reducing output level less than the socially optimum until where the monopoly profit reaches its maximum. This implies inward FDI to SOE does not play a role to increase SOE's productivity, as widely been argued by previous literature on inward FDI, it is just for earning monopoly profit. In order to estimate the model consistently, we use three different estimation methods, which are OLS, panel data model, and censored tobit. Since the model is derived from the theory that we reviewed in the section 3, OLS with time and cross section dummies yields consistent estimation as long as the data has no uncontrolled cross sectional heterogeneity. Panel data model estimation, called random effect and fixed effect, yields consistent estimation when there exists the uncontrolled heterogeneity. The most suspicious source of bias, inconsistent estimation, in FDI studies is data censoring problem. Because FDI purchases either physical capital or firms' stock, it is obvious that the investor is able to sell it . This is the case where FDI takes negative value so that the existence of negative FDI has to be considered but in fact, FDI data used to record only the amount of FDI receives at a given time.
The data censoring is a well know source of bias in econometrics, and a method to detect and control inconsistent estimation has been developed, called Censored Tobit model. To illustrate inconsistent estimation problem in FDI model, here we consider a vector representation of the model (5.1) as: 2) where I * it is latent FDI investment that takes value from negative to positive interval. Let I it be an observable FDI record that takes value only from positive interval so that I it = max(0, I to estimate is following:
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are normal probability distribution and cumulative distribution functions respectively. The far right term is called inverse mills ratio and it plays a role as an omitted variable so any estimators without controlling the inverse mills ratio yields inconsistency if the data is left censored and any independent variables is correlated with the inverse mills ratio. Table 3 reports the FDI model estimates using the three different methods. The last two columns report censored tobit regression results, and the last row of the two columns show that inverse mills ratio is highly significant. This implies rest of two estimations would be biased. As we can see in the first row, mark ups, defined by subtracting average total cost from average total revenue, are negative in both OLS and Panel data model while censored tobit estimate it as positive. Negative mark up means that FDI leads SOEs sacrificing their monopoly profit to produce more and it is the case where social welfare is improved by FDI. Censored tobit estimates shows that, however, the positive role of FDI is exaggerated by data censoring bias. By looking at the second and fourth rows, output and labor input, we can see the same pattern as mark-up shows the difference between censored tobit and the other estimations. In OLS and panel data model, output and labor input are positive but insignificant for all estimations, which means the firms try to realize monopoly profit by reducing output and labor input when they receive FDI, but it does not make significant increasing in mark-up. More precisely, we can interpret the OLS and panel data model estimates on the foreign investors' perspective that foreign investors, who are willing to invest on SOEs, prefer to invest on the SOEs in which the positive profit is guaranteed. The output and capital input are positive in the fifth and sixth column, which come up with positive and significant coefficients of mark-up, whereas coefficients of labor input are negative in both estimates. The only difference between two model, estimated by censored tobit, is whether it controls for industry or group company by dummy variables. Because data matrix becomes singular once the both firms and group dummies are considered at the same time, we could not try to estimate the model with both group and industry dummies to obtain group and industry fixed effect estimation. Thus, interpreting only the coefficients that have same sign in both censored tobit model is relevant. Even though we can only interpret mark up and privatization that have same signs, however, the consequences that FDI flows into SOE to earn monopoly profit as its return does not change because those two censored tobit estimations are consistent with each other. Privatized SOE is clearly good chance to excise monopoly pricing for both domestic and foreign investors. Overall, the several different estimates of FDI on SOEs shows that 1) the foreign investors consider the mark-up profit of SOEs, which is given by the government pricing strategy so that it is stable and less risky, 2) the foreign investors do also consider production technology of the SOEs but it is only for capital intensive production technology, not labor intensive one, and 3) the privatized SOEs are highly preferable for the foreign investors. These three facts that we found from the empirical analysis draw a new perspective on the positive effect of FDI on domestic firms and business, different with previous literature on FDI effect. Because the foreign investors prefer the firms that have capital intensive production technology (positive coefficient of capital input) with small number of employees (negative coefficient of labor input), and give the highest priority on privatization of SOEs (largest coefficient values of privatization). These three are all the strong evidence that the foreign investors make FDI decision on the SOEs in which the higher and stable profit is guaranteed, so that increasing firms' productivity and competing with the other firms that operate in a same industry would not be necessary.
Result
It is possible that the foreign investors care about investing SOEs' productivity as much as about the stable and risk-less investment return they will earn. But because of the ROI fixed pricing, the SOEs have no incentive to increase their productivity by devoting more time and money. Even for the privatized SOEs, furthermore, increasing productivity and competing with the other firms are not attractive. The coefficient of capital inputs tells that the higher capital asset the firm has, the more FDI flows into. It implies also that the industry in which the SOE operates is dominated by economy of scales so it easily turns out to be a natural monopoly. In this circumstance, the SOE might obtain already monopoly power and will excise monopoly pricing immediately after privatized, and the foreign investors know about this fact. Since the reduction of output level from competitive level of output is the monopoly pricing, the inference about the foreign investors' willingness to reduce output level so that inward FDI on the SOEs is not going to increase the firms' productivity and performance is obvious and relevant.
In order to examine the inference, inward FDI on SOEs does not affect on firms' productivity and performance, we perform the model estimations with two different measures of firm performance as dependent variables and the lagged cumulative FDI receipts as independent variables. The two measures of firm performance are the return on invested capital (ROIC) and the return on asset (ROA), defined as the proportion of sum of net sales plus interest payments and the net sales itself respectively, out of the total asset.
11 Table 4 report the model estimates with different lagged FDI variables to investigate both short-run and long-run effect of FDI on firms' performance. As we can see at the top three rows in all columns, non of model estimate and lagged FDIs are statistically significant. The other interesting fact that greater output level and lower capital input SOEs perform better, and the effect of mark-up profit is significant but slightly smaller than the effect of output can also be found in the table 4. These findings are consistent with the basic principle of operating SOEs and the investment on physical capital. The primary goal of SOEs' market operation is to produce goods and services sufficiently at a lower price, and supply to their economy as a whole to make it better off. This goal, called socially optimum, can be achieved regardless of how much the amount of FDI the SOE has been received, and the government would willing to allow earning higher rate of return to the investors. The trade off between the higher rate of return, given by government, and cost to produce more goods and services at a lower price may occur on foreign investors' decision. If any SOEs have fixed the rate of return, foreign investors will search the optimal investment opportunity that yields the highest profit, given by subtracting the marginal cost from the fixed rate of return. The very clear fact is that FDI on SOEs does not necessarily increase productivity and market performance to earn higher return with respect to its amount of investment.
Conclusion
In this study, we revisit characteristics of FDI to investigate whether FDI inflow comes up with productivity spillover effect in which most of FDI literature argued about, or it is identical to the general investment that is determined by rational decision so it has no incentive for additional productivity improvement. Since SOEs have regulated their investment rate of return, by following theory of public institute in public finance, we are able to design and conduct a controlled experiment in which market structure and its related mark-up are exogenously determined by the government, so that we can demonstrate the pure motivation of FDI inflow.
From the empirical analysis of the Korean operating SOEs and privatized SOEs' panel data, we find that FDI in SOEs tends to flow into the SOEs with higher mark-up, level of physical capital, which is measured by fixed asset, and production. In the mean while, the FDI does not tend to flow into the SOEs with higher number of employments. These two evidences support weakly that FDI tends to search and flow into the firm, where there is an easy chance to exercise mark-up profit and the associated investment return, which does not necessary to improve the firm's production level. In order to confirm this finding, we analyze FDI effects on the SOEs' performance, and we find that any combinations of three years lagged FDI do not report statistical significances, which means that FDI in SOEs do not make any improvement of the SOEs' market performance with in three years.
As we introduced in section 2, the Korean government has provided remarkable benefit package for inward FDI, and this is probably the general tendency for governments of developing countries with assuming that FDI yields additional productivity improvement, called spillover effect, compared to the domestic investment. The main justification of existence of FDI spillover effect is its relatively higher commitment to improve the domestic firm's productivity and global competitiveness because it owns the firm's fixed asset, the physical capital. The whole empirical analyses in this study, however, indicate the opposite consequences, and these might conflict with the argument of FDI related literature.
Misguided open market policy may lead significant inflow of FDI into monopoly firms in their countries and yields serious market failure. This misguided policy, in addition, can be justified by misleaded economic, or social scientific studies that exaggerate the effect of FDI with roughly designed empirical analyses. We would like to claim that, with the acceptance of limitation of this study that the observed sample is SOEs, FDI should be reevaluated on the indifferent perspective between FDI and the general investment such as domestic physical capital investment, or portfolio investment. , and * * * indicate respectively that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant under 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
